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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-wirelela-deleg-requirements-00" category="info" submissionType="IETF" xml:lang="en">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="DNS DELEG Requirements">Problem Statement and Requirements for an Improved DNS Delegation Mechanism</title>

    <author initials="D." surname="Lawrence" fullname="David Lawrence">
      <organization>Salesforce</organization>
      <address>
        <email>tale@dd.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="E." surname="Lewis" fullname="Ed Lewis">
      <organization></organization>
      <address>
        <email>eppdnsprotocols@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="J." surname="Reid" fullname="Jim Reid">
      <organization></organization>
      <address>
        <email>jim@rfc1035.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="T." surname="Wicinski" fullname="Tim Wicinski">
      <organization></organization>
      <address>
        <email>tjw.ietf@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2024" month="July" day="08"/>

    <area>Internet</area>
    <workgroup>Internet Engineering Task Force</workgroup>
    <keyword>dns</keyword> <keyword>delegations</keyword>

    <abstract>


<?line 29?>

<t>Authoritative control of parts of the Domain Name System namespace are
indicated with a special record type, the NS record, that can only
indicate the name of the server which a client resolver should contact
for more information. Any other features of that server must then be
discovered through other mechanisms.  This draft considers the
limitations of the current system, benefits that could be gained by
changing it, and what requirements constrain an updated design.</t>



    </abstract>



  </front>

  <middle>


<?line 39?>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>In the Domain Name System <xref target="STD13"/>, subtrees within the domain name
hierarchy are indicated by delegations to servers which are
authoritative for their portion of the namespace.  The DNS records
that do this, called NS records, can only represent the name of a
nameserver.  In practice, clients can expect nothing out of this
delegated server other than that it will answer DNS requests on UDP
port 53.</t>

<t>As the DNS has evolved over the past four decades, this has proven to
be a barrier for the efficient introduction of new DNS technology,
particularly for interacting with servers other than via UDP or TCP on
port 53.  Many features that have been conceived come with additional
overhead as they are limited by this least common denominator of
nameserver functionality.</t>

<t>Various mechanisms have been proposed for communicating additional
information about authoritative nameservers.  This document
investigates problems that could be addressed with a new delegation
mechanism and the factors that need to be considered in the design of
a solution.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="terminology"><name>Terminology</name>

<t>This document assumes familiarity with DNS terms as defined in
<xref target="BCP219"/>.  Additionally, the following new terms are introduced:</t>

<dl newline="true">
  <dt>DELEG</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A new method of DNS delegation, matching the requirements in this
document but not presuming any particular mechanism, including
previous specific proposals that used this name</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Zone Operator</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The person or organization responsible for the nameserver which
serves the zone</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Service Access Point</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The network address tuple at which a zone is served</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

</section>
<section anchor="requirements-framework"><name>Requirements Framework</name>

<t>The requirements constraining any proposed changes to DNS delegations
fall broadly into two categories.</t>

<t>"Hard requirements" are those that must be followed by a successful
protocol <xref target="RFC5218"/>, because violating them would present too much
of an obstacle for broad adoption.  These will primarily be related to
the way the existing Domain Name System functions at all levels.</t>

<t>"Soft requirements" are those that are desirable, but the absence of
which does not intrinsically eliminate a design.  These will largely
be descriptive of the problems that are trying to be addressed with a
new method, or features that would ease adoption.</t>

<t>The context used here will be for the Domain Name System as it exists
under the ICANN root and the Registry/Registrar/Registrant model
(reference), and some conditions will only be relevant there. While it
is expected that any design which satisfies the requirements of put
forth here would be broadly applicable for any uses of the DNS outside
of this environment, such uses are not in scope.</t>

<section anchor="hard-requirements"><name>Hard Requirements</name>

<t>The following strictures are necessary in a new delegation design.</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>DELEG must not disrupt the existing registration model of domains.
Reservation of a name at a registry will still use the relevant
registrar system to indicate the authorized registrant.</t>
  <t>DELEG must not change current namespace semantics. The nameserver
(NS) record type will continue to define the delegation of authority
between a parent zone and a child zone exactly as it has for
decades.</t>
  <t>DELEG must not negatively impact most DNS software.  This is
intentionally a bit vague with regard to "most", because it can't be
absolutely guaranteed for all possible DNS software on the network.
However, the working group should strive to test any proposed
mechanism against a wide range of legacy software and come to a
consensus as to what constitutes adherence to this requirement.</t>
  <t>DELEG must be able to secure delegations with DNSSEC.  Ideally it
should be able to convey an even stronger security model for
delegations than currently exists.</t>
  <t>DELEG must support updates to delegation information with the same
relative ease as currently exists with NS records.  Changes should
take the same amount of time (eg, controlled by a DNS TTL) and allow
a smooth transition between different operational platforms.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="soft-requirements"><name>Soft Requirements</name>

<t>The following items are the aspirational goals for this work,
describing the features that are desired beyond what current NS-based
delegations provide.</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>DELEG should facilitate the use of new DNS transport mechanisms,
including those already defined by DNS-over-TLS (DoT <xref target="RFC7858"/>),
DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH <xref target="RFC8484"/>), and DNS-over-Quic (DoQ
<xref target="RFC9520"/>).  It should easily allow the adoption of new transport
mechanisms.</t>
  <t>DELEG should make clear all of the necessary details for contacting
a Service Access Point -- its protocol, port, and any other
data that would be required to initiate a DNS query.</t>
  <t>DELEG should minimize transaction cost in its usage.  This includes,
but is not limited to, packet count, packet volume, and the amount
of time it takes to resolve a query.</t>
  <t>DELEG should enable a DNS operator to manage DNS service more
completely on behalf of registrants.  For example, DELEG could
address long-standing issues of DNSSEC record maintenance that now
often depend on registrant/registrar interaction.  Similarly, DELEG
could allow new transports to be deployed by an operator without
necessitating that delegation information be modified by the
registrant.</t>
  <t>DELEG should allow for backward compatibility to the conventional
NS-based delegation mechanism.  That is, a Zone Operator who wants
to maintain a single source of truth of delegation information using
DELEG should be able to easily have Do53 delegations derived from
it.</t>
  <t>DELEG should be easily extensible, much like the Extension
Mechanisms for DNS <xref target="RFC6891"/>. allowing for the incremental addition
of new parameters without needing all of the heavy lifting that is
expected for the initial deployment.</t>
  <t>DELEG should support an in-band means for the child to signal to the
parent that parent-side records related to the child should be
updated, akin to CDS/CDNSKEY <xref target="RFC8078"/>.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="IANA"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<t>This memo includes no request to IANA.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="Security"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<t>Updating the means by which DNS delegation information is communicated
has tremendous implications for the security of the Internet.  This
section will be made more robust in future drafts.  Contributions
welcome.</t>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>



    <references title='Informative References' anchor="sec-informative-references">



<referencegroup anchor="STD13" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std13">
  <reference anchor="RFC1034" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034">
    <front>
      <title>Domain names - concepts and facilities</title>
      <author fullname="P. Mockapetris" initials="P." surname="Mockapetris"/>
      <date month="November" year="1987"/>
      <abstract>
        <t>This RFC is the revised basic definition of The Domain Name System. It obsoletes RFC-882. This memo describes the domain style names and their used for host address look up and electronic mail forwarding. It discusses the clients and servers in the domain name system and the protocol used between them.</t>
      </abstract>
    </front>
    <seriesInfo name="STD" value="13"/>
    <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1034"/>
    <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1034"/>
  </reference>
  <reference anchor="RFC1035" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035">
    <front>
      <title>Domain names - implementation and specification</title>
      <author fullname="P. Mockapetris" initials="P." surname="Mockapetris"/>
      <date month="November" year="1987"/>
      <abstract>
        <t>This RFC is the revised specification of the protocol and format used in the implementation of the Domain Name System. It obsoletes RFC-883. This memo documents the details of the domain name client - server communication.</t>
      </abstract>
    </front>
    <seriesInfo name="STD" value="13"/>
    <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1035"/>
    <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1035"/>
  </reference>
</referencegroup>

<referencegroup anchor="BCP219" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp219">
  <reference anchor="RFC9499" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9499">
    <front>
      <title>DNS Terminology</title>
      <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
      <author fullname="K. Fujiwara" initials="K." surname="Fujiwara"/>
      <date month="March" year="2024"/>
      <abstract>
        <t>The Domain Name System (DNS) is defined in literally dozens of different RFCs. The terminology used by implementers and developers of DNS protocols, and by operators of DNS systems, has changed in the decades since the DNS was first defined. This document gives current definitions for many of the terms used in the DNS in a single document.</t>
        <t>This document updates RFC 2308 by clarifying the definitions of "forwarder" and "QNAME". It obsoletes RFC 8499 by adding multiple terms and clarifications. Comprehensive lists of changed and new definitions can be found in Appendices A and B.</t>
      </abstract>
    </front>
    <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="219"/>
    <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9499"/>
    <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9499"/>
  </reference>
</referencegroup>

<reference anchor="RFC5218">
  <front>
    <title>What Makes for a Successful Protocol?</title>
    <author fullname="D. Thaler" initials="D." surname="Thaler"/>
    <author fullname="B. Aboba" initials="B." surname="Aboba"/>
    <date month="July" year="2008"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Internet community has specified a large number of protocols to date, and these protocols have achieved varying degrees of success. Based on case studies, this document attempts to ascertain factors that contribute to or hinder a protocol's success. It is hoped that these observations can serve as guidance for future protocol work. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5218"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5218"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC7858">
  <front>
    <title>Specification for DNS over Transport Layer Security (TLS)</title>
    <author fullname="Z. Hu" initials="Z." surname="Hu"/>
    <author fullname="L. Zhu" initials="L." surname="Zhu"/>
    <author fullname="J. Heidemann" initials="J." surname="Heidemann"/>
    <author fullname="A. Mankin" initials="A." surname="Mankin"/>
    <author fullname="D. Wessels" initials="D." surname="Wessels"/>
    <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
    <date month="May" year="2016"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) to provide privacy for DNS. Encryption provided by TLS eliminates opportunities for eavesdropping and on-path tampering with DNS queries in the network, such as discussed in RFC 7626. In addition, this document specifies two usage profiles for DNS over TLS and provides advice on performance considerations to minimize overhead from using TCP and TLS with DNS.</t>
      <t>This document focuses on securing stub-to-recursive traffic, as per the charter of the DPRIVE Working Group. It does not prevent future applications of the protocol to recursive-to-authoritative traffic.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7858"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7858"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8484">
  <front>
    <title>DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH)</title>
    <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
    <author fullname="P. McManus" initials="P." surname="McManus"/>
    <date month="October" year="2018"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document defines a protocol for sending DNS queries and getting DNS responses over HTTPS. Each DNS query-response pair is mapped into an HTTP exchange.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8484"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8484"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9520">
  <front>
    <title>Negative Caching of DNS Resolution Failures</title>
    <author fullname="D. Wessels" initials="D." surname="Wessels"/>
    <author fullname="W. Carroll" initials="W." surname="Carroll"/>
    <author fullname="M. Thomas" initials="M." surname="Thomas"/>
    <date month="December" year="2023"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In the DNS, resolvers employ caching to reduce both latency for end users and load on authoritative name servers. The process of resolution may result in one of three types of responses: (1) a response containing the requested data, (2) a response indicating the requested data does not exist, or (3) a non-response due to a resolution failure in which the resolver does not receive any useful information regarding the data's existence. This document concerns itself only with the third type.</t>
      <t>RFC 2308 specifies requirements for DNS negative caching. There, caching of TYPE 2 responses is mandatory and caching of TYPE 3 responses is optional. This document updates RFC 2308 to require negative caching for DNS resolution failures.</t>
      <t>RFC 4035 allows DNSSEC validation failure caching. This document updates RFC 4035 to require caching for DNSSEC validation failures.</t>
      <t>RFC 4697 prohibits aggressive requerying for NS records at a failed zone's parent zone. This document updates RFC 4697 to expand this requirement to all query types and to all ancestor zones.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9520"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9520"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC6891">
  <front>
    <title>Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS(0))</title>
    <author fullname="J. Damas" initials="J." surname="Damas"/>
    <author fullname="M. Graff" initials="M." surname="Graff"/>
    <author fullname="P. Vixie" initials="P." surname="Vixie"/>
    <date month="April" year="2013"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Domain Name System's wire protocol includes a number of fixed fields whose range has been or soon will be exhausted and does not allow requestors to advertise their capabilities to responders. This document describes backward-compatible mechanisms for allowing the protocol to grow.</t>
      <t>This document updates the Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS(0)) specification (and obsoletes RFC 2671) based on feedback from deployment experience in several implementations. It also obsoletes RFC 2673 ("Binary Labels in the Domain Name System") and adds considerations on the use of extended labels in the DNS.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="75"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6891"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6891"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8078">
  <front>
    <title>Managing DS Records from the Parent via CDS/CDNSKEY</title>
    <author fullname="O. Gudmundsson" initials="O." surname="Gudmundsson"/>
    <author fullname="P. Wouters" initials="P." surname="Wouters"/>
    <date month="March" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>RFC 7344 specifies how DNS trust can be maintained across key rollovers in-band between parent and child. This document elevates RFC 7344 from Informational to Standards Track. It also adds a method for initial trust setup and removal of a secure entry point.</t>
      <t>Changing a domain's DNSSEC status can be a complicated matter involving multiple unrelated parties. Some of these parties, such as the DNS operator, might not even be known by all the organizations involved. The inability to disable DNSSEC via in-band signaling is seen as a problem or liability that prevents some DNSSEC adoption at a large scale. This document adds a method for in-band signaling of these DNSSEC status changes.</t>
      <t>This document describes reasonable policies to ease deployment of the initial acceptance of new secure entry points (DS records).</t>
      <t>It is preferable that operators collaborate on the transfer or move of a domain. The best method is to perform a Key Signing Key (KSK) plus Zone Signing Key (ZSK) rollover. If that is not possible, the method using an unsigned intermediate state described in this document can be used to move the domain between two parties. This leaves the domain temporarily unsigned and vulnerable to DNS spoofing, but that is preferred over the alternative of validation failures due to a mismatched DS and DNSKEY record.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8078"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8078"/>
</reference>




    </references>


<?line 190?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="Acknowledgements"><name>Acknowledgements</name>

</section>


  </back>

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